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I begin from Aldo Facio’s wonderful, awful story of writing an exam
question on whether law is an art or a science, and receiving a harsh
F with the comment “Who asked your opinion?” This story raises two
important questions for Latin American lawyers committed to the
perspective of gender. The first concerns whether they should make
assault on objectivity an integral part of their agenda. The second
concerns their analysis of gender and power.
I. IS LAW OBJECTIVE?
In her insightful analysis of the jurisprudence surrounding Peru’s
Law on Family Violence, Rocio Villanueva Flores notes that judges
have been reluctant to apply that law on the grounds that it is a vague
statute and does not include an adequate definition of family
violence.1 This explains the urgency of Alda Facio’s sense that
feminists need to undermine the traditional notion that law is a
neutral, self-executing system of rules.
If the goal is to challenge this vision of law, one possible resource is
the so-called “indeterminacy critique” developed in critical legal
studies in the United States during the 1980s. Authors such as Joseph
William Singer2 and James Boyle3 argued that law is “indeterminate.”
1. Rocio Villanueva Flores, Notas sobre interpretacion juridica (A proposito de la ley 26260 y la
violencia familiar), in VIOLENCIA CONTRA LA MUJER: REFLEXIONES DESDE EL DERECHO (1996).
2. See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.
J. 1, 9 (1984) (stating that the law is a description of the arguments and theories that are
currently used by judges and scholars to justify outcomes and rules).
3. See James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133
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Others, such as Mark Kelman deconstructed legal arguments by
“trashing” legal arguments’ claims to objectivity.4 Robert Gordon
showed how existing patterns of argumentation served to “freeze
social reality” and make alternative visions seem implausible.5 This
critique often focused on rights, which were attacked on the grounds
that they alienated people from authentic expressions6 or that they
blinded people to utopian possibilities.7
It is nice to know one does not have to reinvent the wheel, but
several notes of caution are in order. First, having read both the
indeterminacy literature and the Villanueva article, it seems to me
that Villanueva knows most of what was said within critical legal
studies in the 1980s, and that in many ways, she says it better.
A second question is whether this is a battle feminists want to fight.
Within American jurisprudence it proved bitter and divisive, with
constant charges that the objectivity-critiquers were “nihilists” whose
only interest was in trashing. The very considerable costs of this
battle are heightened in Latin America for two reasons.
In the United States, the indeterminacy critique drew upon a
tradition already well-established within American law. The legal
realists attacked the idea that law is neutral and objective in the
1920s, drawing upon a still older tradition of jurisprudence dating to
Oliver Wendell Holmes.8 My understanding of Latin American
jurisprudence remains sketchy, but my impression is that Latin
American countries generally lack a tradition similar to legal realism.
If this is true, a critique of objectivity will place feminists in a much
more exposed position than critical legal scholars in the United
States.
The potential exposure is even greater for another reason. The
final session of the Pan American Conference suggests that a critique
of objectivity, in the Latin American context, pits feminists squarely
against other progressive forces whose identities have been forged by
U. PA. L. REV. 685, 779 (1985) (arguing that the law is somewhat indeterminate shaped by
social subjectivism and structural strands).
4. See Mark Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV . 293 (1984) (defining “trashing” as the
theory which takes specific arguments in their own terms, discovers that they are “foolish” and
then looks externally for some order in the internal chaos).
5. Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV . 195 (1987).
6. Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. IN L. & SOC. 25 (1980).
7. Robin West, Murdering the Spirit: Racism, Rights & Commerce, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1771
(1992).
8. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, MORTON J. HORWITZ, THOMAS REED, AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM (1993); Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV . 457 (1897) (arguing
that the legal system is inconsistent in its objectivity).
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advocacy of human rights and the rule of law. Human rights
advocates, who have forged their identities through fights against
repression and dictatorship, generally have rested their claims for
authority and legitimacy on the charge that existing authorities have
violated universal norms.
The language of human rights rests heavily on notions of
universality of the type that the critique of objectivity targets. Thus, a
feminism focused on the jurisprudential issue of whether objectivity is
possible pits feminists’ claims for legitimacy against those of other
progressive forces in Latin America. Is this wise? It seems to me that,
in a machista culture, the perspective of gender is threatening enough
without burdening it with this additional fight.
Do any alternatives exist? Two deserve consideration. One is to
argue in a pragmatist vein, stressing what law is, rather than what it is
not. While law is not a neutral, self-executing system of rules, it is not
totally indeterminate either.9 The processes by which language
generates meaning are related less to logic than to the form of life of
which the language is a part; law is part of language.10 The key point,
from a pragmatist perspective, is that certainty represents a statement
about the role a tenet plays in one’s form of life, not a statement
about some ultimate truth with which agreement of all rational
beings is, or should be, automatic.11
Yet even this formulation presents difficulties. Although in my
writings outside of feminism I am best known as a critic of objectivity,
I do not carry that intellectual agenda into my writings on gender.
For one thing, people often confuse objectivity critiques with the
belief that nothing is true, so that one’s feminist credos are quoted
back as evidence of self-contradiction.12 This is silly: it mistakes a
conversation on epistemology, on what truth claims mean, with a
claim that truth claims are incoherent. These are technical issues,
best left for conversations on philosophy. Conversations on gender

9. See Joan Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 588 (1987) (stating that both arguments are premised upon an
“either/or” approach); John Stick, Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV . 332 (1986)
(arguing that practical legal reasoning and process demonstrates how the indeterminate
argument fails).
10. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
3d ed. 1968) (stating that the definition of the law is dependent upon the society over which it
governs).
11. See Joan C. Williams, Symposium: Michael J. Perry’s Morality, Politics, and Law: Abortion,
Incommensurability, and Jurisprudence, 63 TUL. L. REV . 1651 (1989) (critiquing absolutes and a
persisting focus on the way viewpoints may affect perceptions).
12. See, e.g., Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV . 254 (1992)
(questioning the viability of feminism during postmodern critique of reason).
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are already too fraught with difficulties to allow these issues to enter
and confuse.
An alternative approach is to entirely evade profound questions
concerning objectivity. In the context of gender, the key problem is
that even conceding that objectivity is possible, courts and legislatures
fail to live up to their own stated standards of objectivity in their
treatment of women. Thus, the Peruvian Law on Family Violence is
not enforced on the grounds that it is too vague, whereas other
equally vague laws are enforced without comment. One does not
have to engage in philosophical discussions to mark this as
inappropriate and unfair.
From the perspective of gender, all we need to show is that current
laws, and the ways they are interpreted, do not live up to their own
claims to objectivity. Let human rights advocates argue that law can
be neutral and objective; we may disagree, or argue that its objectivity
means something much more complex and contingent than they
assume. But the key point for feminists is that, bracketing the
question of whether law is ever objective, the laws we object to are
not.
II. WHICH ANALYSIS OF G ENDER AND POWER?
My second brief comment concerns gender and power. Ten years
of work in feminist jurisprudence in the United States has informed
me about the relationship between gender and power. But it has also
confused me, in ways that only began to clear up when I read Alda
Facio’s subtle and astute Cuando el Genero Suena, Cambios Trae.13
Feminist jurisprudence in the United States often elides the
question of whether feminists need an analysis of gender and power.
Catherine MacKinnon’s analysis of gender as dominance has many
strengths. Her theory picked up a theme that has been around since
the early years of second-wave feminism, for example in the
influential Desire and Power,14 and has developed it into a full-blown
theory of gender. MacKinnon’s sustained analysis of the ways our
sexuality eroticizes dominance and submission is an important and
enduring contribution, and has been accompanied by movements
designed to separate power from desire in the workplace (sexual
harassment law), the home (domestic violence law), and in
entertainment (pornography).

13. ALDA FACIO, CUANDO EL GENERO SUENA CAMBIOS TRAE (1996).
14. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM U NMODIFIED: DISCOURSE ON
LIFE AND LAW 46 (Catherine Stimpson ed., 1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED].
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